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property was not present.
A nuisance claim emanates from the notion that anything that is
injurious to one's health or an obstruction to the free use and
comfortable enjoyment of life or property constitutes a nuisance. A
nuisance cause of action cannot substitute for a dangerous condition
of property cause of action in a situation when the cause of the
nuisance itself is a dangerous condition of property.
Paterno
effectively showed the trial court's error in granting defendant's
directed verdict, but nonetheless made minimal effort to show
prejudice derived from the directed verdict. Therefore, the court
found harmless error. The court reasoned that Paterno had the duty
of asserting a prejudice claim and arguing how the error equated to a
miscarriage ofjustice. The court ordered a new trial.
SaraFranklin

COLORADO
Eagle Peak Farms, Ltd. v. Lost Creek Ground Water Management
Dist., No. 98CA1518, 1999 WL 771014 (Colo. App. Sept. 30, 1999)
(holding that accomplishing personal service within thirty days is a
procedural requirement, the violation of which does not mandate
dismissal of an appeal).
Eagle Peak Farms ("Eagle Peak") filed an application for a change
of water rights with the Colorado Ground Water Commission and the
Lost Creek Ground Water Management District ("District"). After a
hearing, the District denied the application. Eagle Peak then filed a
notice of appeal in the district court. Eagle Peak failed, however, to
timely serve three of the twenty defendants and interested-party
defendants. Due to this failure, the district court dismissed the appeal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal and lack of
personal jurisdiction over the three defendants.
On appeal, Eagle Peak argued that although the filing of the
notice of appeal with the court was jurisdictional, once timely filed, the
appeal has been perfected even though all interested parties may not
have been served personally with such notice within thirty days. The
District, to the contrary, argued that notice of the appeal must be
served personally upon all parties within the thirty day time period or
the appeal must be dismissed for lack of subject matterjurisdiction.
In reviewing the appeal and the arguments set forth by both sides,
the court held that violation of a procedural requirement did not
mandate dismissal of the appeal. The court held that filing a timely
notice of appeal in the district court invoked subject matter
jurisdiction for the appeal; subject matter jurisdiction could not be
waived. On the other hand, procedural requirements were intended
to facilitate proceedings before the court. Once a court's subject
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matter jurisdiction was properly invoked, a party's failure to comply
with a procedural requirement could justify the court's dismissal of
that action. A procedural requirement, service must be accomplished
upon all proper and necessary parties. The court held that actual
service, however, rather than its timing, perfected the appeal.
Accordingly, because the thirty day service of notice requirement was
procedural, plaintiffs failure to timely serve the three parties did not
require dismissal of the action.
CarolinePayne

CONNECTICUT
Albahary v. City of Bristol, No. CV 970482781, 1999 WL 185131
(Conn. Supp. Mar. 16, 1999) (holding that a statute authorizing the
City of Bristol's condemnation of an easement on plaintiffs' property
was constitutional because it was enacted for the legitimate and public
purpose of complying with a Consent Order).
In 1995, the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection
("CDEP") entered into a Consent Order with the City of Bristol
("City"). The City agreed to investigate and study the damage to a
city-owned landfill that was leaking contaminants. The Consent
Order did not require the City to clean up the contaminants. Instead,
the Consent Order required the City to take control of all affected
land within the contamination's zone of influence. The Consent
Order defined the zone as the area where leachate and ground water
mixed, or could potentially mix.
The Albahary's land bordered the landfill and was deemed within
the contaminated zone. In 1996, the Connecticut General Assembly
enacted Special Act 96-12 ("Special Act"). The Special Act allowed for
condemnation in those cases involving city-owned landfills when the
condemned land was outside a municipality's corporate limits. In
August of 1997, pursuant to the Special Act, the City began
condemnation proceedings to acquire an easement onto Albahary's
land. Albahary challenged the constitutionality of the Special Act,
seeking to have the Special Act declared invalid, unconstitutional, and
against public policy.
The court first noted that the constitutional issue was dispositive.
If the court found the Special Act unconstitutional, the need to
address Albahary's additional arguments was obviated. The court
found the Special Act to be constitutional and valid.
The court pointed out that any legislation for the economic or
social welfare of its constituents would be constitutional if there were a
rational and legitimate state purpose. If the Special Act met this twopart test, then it satisfied the due process requirement. Here, the
Special Act met the two-part test. Albahary did not contest the validity

